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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
JOSEPH HOWE, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20141013 -CA 
Dist. Ct. Case No. 131911063MO 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appealed his Conviction for Lewdness Involving a Child, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code §76-9-702.5. This Court has jurisdiction 
~ pursuant to Utah Code §78A-4-103(2)(e) wherein the Court is granted jurisdiction in 
appeals from a court of record in criminal cases. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
A. Issues: 
1. Whether the non-specific motion for directed verdict preserved the specific 
grounds for appeal. 
Standard of review: To the extent that Defendant did not preserve his claims before the 
trial court~ he must establish plain error, ineffective assistance of counseL or exceptional 
circumstances to wairant review by this court. See State v. Lmv, 2008 UT 58, ~ 19, 192 
..ii) P.3d 867; State v. Ko-:.lov, 2012 UT App 114, ,r 28 .. 276 P.3d 1207, 1218. 
1 
"Each basis for such review of an unpreserved issue presents a legaJ question that 
we review for correctness." See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, il 6, 89 P.3d 162. 
2. The trial court was correct in denying the motion for a directed verdict 
when the testimony established that the defendant was observed in an act 
characterized as masturbating by three witnesses. 
Standard of review: The review of a denial of a motion for directed verdict is 
correctness of the trial court's conclusion that the evidence established a prima facie case. 
State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, 988 P.2d 949. We review a trial court's ruling on a 
motion for directed verdict for correctness. Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 
49, iJ 19,221 P.3d 205. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, RULES, AND ST A TUTES 
Utah Code 76-9-702.5: 
A person is guilty of lewdness involving a child if the person under 
circumstances not amounting to rape of a child, object rape of a child, 
sodomy upon a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a 
child, or an attempt to commit any of those offenses, intentionally or 
knowingly does any of the following to, or in the presence of, a child who is 
under 14 years of age: 
(c) masturbates; 
( d) performs any other act of lewdness 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee is satisfied with the Defendant's statement of the case. 
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STATEMENTS OF FACTS1 
On September 14, 2013 at a park located in Salt Lake City, Mr. And Mrs. 
Lindsley and Mr. Buie observed a man sitting near a tree next to a playground adjacent 
to an off leash dog park. All witnesses identified the defendant as the man sitting near 
the tree. Mr. Lindsley testified that he thought the defendant's position with his jacket 
draped over the front of him seemed a "little bit odd." R. 64:59 Mr. Lindsley continued 
to state that he couldn't see underneath what the defendant had draped over him, but 
"seemed to be moving in a manner" that lead Mr. Lindsley to believe "he might be 
touching himself." R. 64:60. Mr. Lindsley was concerned and called the police. He 
stated that the defendant was ten to fifteen feet from the playground. Id. Mr. Lindsley 
stated that the defendant's same actions continued for about 15 minutes until the police 
arrived. R. 64:61. He stated that there were "about a dozen kids playing" in the 
playground and Mr. Lindsley's two minor children were with him. R. 64:58. The 
defendant remained fixated on "looking at the children playing" despite other activity 
going on around the park. R. 64:63. 
Mrs. Lindsley had similar testimony, but specifically stated "Umm, what I 
believed to be [ occurring] was the defendant masturbating. Though his lap was 
covered, it appeared as if he was sitting, facing -to me it looked like he was facing the 
children with something of a fixated expression on his face and it looked to me as if he 
1 The City agrees with the defendant that the evidence to be considered should only be the 
evidence presented prior to the motion for directed verdict, and will not cite to testimony 
or facts that were introduced after the motion for directed verdict. The City objects to 
Defendant's use of his own testimony which was not presented to the court at the time the 
trial court ruled on his motion for directed verdict. See App. Brief pg 8. 
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was masturbating underneath some kind of cover because his hands were invisible and 
there was a bit of a gyrating motion that I witnessed." R. 64: 65-66. She stated that her 
own minor children were with her and that the defendant was ten to fifteen feet from 
the playground which had fifteen to twenty children present. R. 64:67-68. Mrs. 
Lindsley testified that this activity occurred for ten to twenty minutes. Id. 
Mr. Buie testified that he "saw a man sitting next to a tree right in front of the 
playground area and he had a jacket over his waist area and it looked like he was 
masturbating." R. 64:73. When asked why it appeared the defendant was masturbating, 
Mr. Buie replied "[b ]ecause there was pretty vigorous movement underneath the jacket 
that looked like it was masturbating. It wasn't the whole body moving, ... it appeared 
to be just the arm moving underneath the jacket in the crotc~ area." Id. Mr. Buie 
testified that the children in the area appeared to be between the ages of four and eight. 
R. 64:74 
Officer Southworth testified that when he arrived the defendant became very 
nervous and slowly removed the jacket and "[the defendant] looked down at his pants 
with particular interest ... [at] a wet spot on his pants." The spot was on the defendant's 
genital area. R. 64:78. Officer Southworth on cross examination stated that the wet 
spot was small, and if it was urine it was not a lot. R. 64:81. When asked by Officer 
Livsey, the defendant stated that his "penis leaked." R. 64:85. Officer Livsey when 
asked by defense counsel if it could have been urine, he testified that it would have 
been a small amount, and in his experience "[t]ypically when people urinate 
themselves there's quite a bit more liquid than that." R. 64:89. 
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After the testimony of Officer Livsey, the City rested. The Defendant upon the 
Court asking if there were any motions stated: 
"Yes, Your Honor, I would move for a directed verdict. I do not believe the city 
has met their burden to prove that a reasonable jury would be able to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that this offense actually occurred. I would submit." R. 64:94. 
The Court denied the motion for directed verdict. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant failed to specifically challenge the evidence and made only a pro 
forma motion for directed verdict. By summarily challenging that the City has not met 
their burden without providing specifics that the court could rule on, Defendant failed 
to preserve his claim that the evidence failed to show he had the intent or did not 
commit a lewd act in the presence of children. 
The defendant challenging a denial of a directed verdict must overcome a substantial 
burden on appeal to show that the trial court erred in denying the motion for a directed 
verdict. The City presented sufficient evidence in it case-in-chief through witnesses, who 
stated they believed the defendant to be masturbating, that the defendant was in the park 
committing a lewd act in the presence of children. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. This Court should decline to address the specific challenges to the evidence as 
Defendant did not preserve the issue with his generic directed verdict motion. 
"To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue in 
the trial court, giving that court an opportunity to rule on the issue." Weiser v. Union 
Pac. R.R. Co., 2010 UT 4, ,r 14,247 P.3d 357. Defendant failed to preserve the issue 
with specificity that the court could address each of the three elements Defendant raises 
on appeal. Defendant does not address any of the necessary elements to challenge an 
issue which is not preserved. "When a party fails to preserve an issue for appeal, we 
will address the issue only if ( 1) the appellant establishes that the district court 
committed "plain error," (2) "exceptional circumstances" exist, or (3) in some 
situations, if the appellant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing 
to preserve the issue. State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, ,r 18, 122 P.3d 566; State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 114, ,r 21 n.2, 61 P.3d 106.2 as cited in State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ,r 
19, 192 P.3d 867,874. In the present case Defendant simply stated that he "move[s] for 
a directed verdict." Defendant without specificity argued, "I do not believe the City has 
met their burden to prove that a reasonable jury would be able to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that this offense actually occurred." R. 64:94. This argument is 
insufficient for the court to rule on as a motion. "When evaluating a motion for a 
directed verdict 'the court is not free to weigh the evidence and thus invade the 
province of the jury, whose prerogative it is to judge the facts.' Rather, the court's role 
is to determine whether the state has produced 'believable evidence' on each element 
6 
of the crime from which a jury, acting reasonably, could convict the defendant." State 
v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ,r 32, 84 P.3d 1183, l 190-9l(intemal citations omitted). In the 
present case the testimony was consistent that it appeared to the 'civilian' witnesses 
that the defendant was masturbating, and the officers' testimony supported those 
witnesses' reasonable belief. 
"A generic motion for directed verdict will preserve a specific ground for appeal 
when "the specific ground for an objection is clear from its context." State v. Gonzalez, 
2015 UT 10, ,f 26, 345 P .3d 1168, cited in State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ,I 22 789 
Utah Adv. Rep. 21. It is not clear in the present case as it was clear in Gonzales what 
the defendant's theory of the case was. In Gonzales the Defendant's opening statement 
made it clear to the court that his theory was self defense. When Gonzales moved for a 
directed verdict, "the trial court would necessarily have understood from the context 
that [the defendant] was asserting that the State had failed to meet its burden of 
showing that he had not acted in self-defense." Id. The opening statement made by 
Defendant in the present case focused on illusions, magic tricks, and burdens of proof. 
R64:54-56. The theory of the defendant's case was not made clear to the court, and the 
court would have no understanding of the context of the generic motion for directed 
verdict. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." In deciding whether a motion made in the trial court was sufficient to preserve 
an argument made on appeal, we look to rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which requires a motion to "state succinctly and with particularity the 
grounds upon which it is made and the relief sought." Where the grounds upon which a 
motion is made before the trial court differ from the grounds argued on appeal, 
appellate courts will generally dismiss those arguments as unpreserved. 
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State v. Gonzales 2015 UT 10 ,I 24 345 P.3d 1168 at 1175.(intemal citations 
omitted) 
Defendant has not raised any plain error, exceptional circumstances or 
ineffective assistance claims in his brief, which would be necessary for this Court to 
review an unpreserved issue. 
II. The Trial Court did not err denying the directed verdict motion, and 
evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for Lewdness Involving a 
Child. 
Defendant has not shown that the evidence could not support a conviction nor has 
he showed that the City failed to establish a prima facia case against Defendant. 
A defendant must overcome a substantial burden on appeal to show that the trial 
court erred in denying a motion for directed verdict. We will uphold a trial 
court's denial of a motion for directed verdict "based on a claim of insufficiency 
of the evidence" if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, "some 
evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the 
crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 
5, ,I 29, 84 P.3d 1183 (internal quotation marks omitted). [Defendant] must 
therefore show that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, no 
evidence existed from which a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that [ defendant committed the crime]. 
Gonzalez v. State, 2015 UT 10, ,I 27,345 P.3d 1168, 1176 
Defendant has failed to state evidence that would show that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for directed verdict. The City in this case presented evidence that 
the witnesses concluded that Defendant was "touching himself' or "masturbating" and 
children were present. R. 64:60, 65-66, 73. The only disputing evidence2 the trial court 
2 Other evidence was presented by the Defendant after the motion for directed verdict. 
The City maintains that it is not proper for this Court to review evidence not known to the 
trial court at the time when reviewing a denial of Defendant's motion for directed verdict. 
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could consider regarding the motion for directed verdict was elicited through 
statements Defendant made to Officer Livsey stating that Defendant was a religious 
person, would never do something like that [masturbate] and that "he could have been 
scratching himself'. R. 64:84. 
Testimony was presented that Defendant was alone at the time and that his 
actions were his own and voluntary. This court has recognized that "a defendant's 
mental state can be proven by circumstantial evidence, including the nature and extent 
of the criminal act" State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, 1179, 299 P.3d 892. The evidence 
presented was that the defendant was engaged in this act that was described as 
masturbation. There was no evidence presented that the defendant was not acting 
intentionally or that he was not in control of his arms. Defendant stated to Officer 
Livsey that he was intentionally sitting under that tree. R64:87. "It is well established 
that "criminal intent is seldom proved by direct evidence but must be instead inferred 
from the circumstances of the given facts." State v. Cases 2003 UT 55148, 82 P.3d 
1106 citing State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983). The City 
concedes that it did not present direct proof that Defendant was masturbating. None of 
the witnesses saw Defendant manually manipulating his bare genitals for sexual 
gratification. It would be nearly impossible for a prosecution to show with direct 
evidence that a masturbatory act was done for gratification as gratification can only 
exist in the mind of the individual. The prosecution can show circumstantial evidence 
that the act is pleasurable (such as a wet spot or facial expression), but without a 
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statement from a defendant that the act was gratifying, the prosecution must rely on 
circumstantial evidence. 
In the present case, Defendant maintained his demeanor, posture and activity for 
ten to twenty minutes. R. 64:70. His activity was more than a casual scratch or rub. 
Defendant continued the same fixated expression and gyrating motion during that 
time. R. 64: 65-66. Defendant's "vigorous movement underneath the jacket that 
looked like [he] was masturbating" R. 64:73. 
Given the evidence that Defendant continued this activity longer than 10 minutes, 
it is proof that Defendant's motions under his jacket were more than a casual or 
inadvertent motion; Defendant was intentionally moving his arm in a masturbatory 
manner. The trial court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion for directed 
verdict as a prim a f acia case was presented. 
A. The district court properly found that a reasonable jury could reasonably 
infer, from the evidence presented, that Defendant committed an act of 
lewdness. 
The trial court correctly denied Defendants motion for a directed verdict based 
on the evidence presented. 
[T]he distinction between reasonable inference and speculation is intensely 
fact-based. When evidence supports only one possible conclusion, the quality of the 
inference rests on the "reasonable probability that the conclusion flows from the proven 
facts." Id. When the evidence supports more than one possible conclusion, none more 
likely than the other, the choice of one possibility over another can be no more than 
speculation; while a reasonable inference arises when the facts can reasonably be 
interpreted to support a conclusion that one possibility is more probable than another. 
State v. Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, if 16,238 P.3d 1096, 1101. 
The City presented sufficient evidence to prove Defendant was engaged in a 
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lewd act, masturbation, or that Defendant was simulating masturbation. There was no 
other explanation presented to explain why the observations of the witnesses could not 
support a conclusion that Defendant was engaged in a lewd act. 
In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict based on a claim 
of insufficiency of the evidence, we will uphold the trial court's decision if, 
upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn 
from it, we conclude that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury 
could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Therefore, a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the state's 
case may be denied if the trial court finds that the state has established a prima 
facie case against the defendant by producing 'believable evidence of all the 
elements of the crime charged.' The evidence is to be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the state. 
State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ,r 29, 84 P.3d 1183, 1190 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted) 
The evidence presented at the time of the motion for directed verdict supports 
the conclusion that Defendant was either masturbating or in an act similar to 
masturbation which is a lewd act. "To an objective viewer, [the defendant] conveyed 
the appearance of masturbation .... It is precisely this type of conduct that the 
legislature intended to prohibit in enacting the statute." State v. A. T. (in Re A.T.), 2001 
UT 82, ,r 10, 34 P.3d 228,232. In State v A.T., the defendant grabbed his crotch over 
his clothes in a manner that was a deliberate simulation of masturbation. Id. 
Defendant in the present case was in public, although he draped a jacket over him, and 
was staring fixatedly at the playground and moving his arms in a manner which led the 
witnesses to conclude that he was engaged in the act of masturbation. The Officers 
observing a wet spot on the groin area of Defendant's pants supports the conclusions 
of the witnesses. 
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B. Defendant was in the presence of children when he committed the Lewd act. 
Nothing in the statute requires the children to have any other involvement. 
Lewdness involving a child specifically states in sub part 1 "A person is guilty 
of lewdness involving a child if ... intentionally or knowingly does any of the following 
to, or in the presence of, a child who is under 14 years of age" UCA §76-9-702.5 
(emphasis added). The text of the statute makes clear the acts that are prohibited being 
done "to or in the presence of' a child. This court need not determine if the statute is 
lacking clarity, as it is unambiguous that any of the acts committed upon or in the 
presence of a child are a violation of the statute. It is clear from the wording that the 
alternative of"or in the presence" does not require the crime be committed upon the 
child directly, but that it occurred with the child present. "Only if we find the statutory 
language to be ambiguous may we tum to secondary principles of statutory 
construction or look to the statute's legislative history" State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 17, ,r 
11, 133 P.3d 396, 399. "Our overall goal is to give effect to the legislative intent, as 
evidenced by the statute's plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant 
to achieve. Further, we assume the legislative body used each term advisedly and in 
accordance with its ordinary meaning." Baby E.Z. v. T.lZ, 2011 UT 38, ,r 15,266 P.3d 
702, 707 (internal citation and quotations omitted). The wording of the statute is 
construed to prohibit exposing a child, who may or may not know what the act is, from 
sexual activity. 
"This wording of the lewdness involving a child statute proscribes the exposing 
of a child to sexual activity, and the general term "any other act of gross lewdness"3 is 
3 The statute was amended in 1994 House Bill 335 to remove the word "gross" from "any 
other act of lewdness" 
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restricted to a sense analogous to such wording. These acts are committed either by the 
actor upon him or herself, or committed by the actor with or upon a person other than 
the victim, in the presence of the victim who must be under fourteen years of age . 
.;; State v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455,458 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added) 
Utah Code defines "in the presence of a child" in three places: §76-3-203.9 and 
§76-3-203.10 (violent offenses committed in presence of a child), and §76-5-109.1 
( domestic violence in the presence of a child). In all three definitions the consistent 
language in the statute is "having knowledge that a child is present and may see or hear 
[the act]". (emphasis added) Utah code does not provide a definition specifically for the 
sections §76-9-702.5 (the charge in this case) nor Sex Offender in the Presence of a Child 
(§77-27-21.8). "[T]he plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its 
provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other 
statutes under the same and related chapters." State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, 18, 63 
P .3d 667, 669-70 (internal citations and quotations omitted. Emphasis added). Reading the 
"in the presence" language in harmony with other chapters of Title 7 6 of the Utah Code 
provide clear direction that "in the presence" means that a child is present and may see or 
hear the act. 
Reading the statute as Defendant proposes would require involvement of the 
child is contrary to Utah law about how child victims relate to criminal conduct. Utah 
Code §77-37-4 (2) (Victims' Rights- Additional rights - Children) states "Children 
are not responsible for the inappropriate behavior adults commit against them and have 
the right not to be questioned, in any manner, not to have allegations made, implying 
this responsibility ... " UCA §77-37-4 (2010). Construing the statute as Defendant 
suggests would require the child who was in the presence when the act occurred be 
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'involved' would require that the child "be included in some activity ... and take part 
in" the inappropriate behavior of the adult. See App. Brief 18. 
The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for directed verdict as 
the statute is unambiguous and clearly stated that the prohibited conduct must not be 
done to or in the presence of a child. The other sections of the code defining "in the 
presence of a child" are consistent that the child must be present and may see or hear 
the act. Lewdness involving a child does not require 'involvement' of a child, as the 
child is not responsible for the behavior of the adult. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should affirm the district court's 
denial of Defendant's motion for a directed verdict. 
SUBMITTEDthis3td dayofAugust,2015 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
@ 
@ 
76-9-702.5. Lewdness involving a child . 
.;; (1) A person is guilty of lewdness involving a child if the person under circumstances not 
amounting to rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, sexual abuse of a child, 
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, or an attempt to commit any of those offenses, intentionally 
or knowingly does any of the following to, or in the presence of, a child who is under 14 years of 
~ 
~ 
age: 
(a) perfonns an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy; 
(b) exposes his or her genitals, the female breast below the top of the areola, the 
buttocks, the anus, or the pubic area: 
(i) in a public place; or 
(ii) in a private place: 
(A) under circumstances the person should know will likely cause affront or alarm; or 
(B) with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the actor or the child; 
(2) 
(c) masturbates; 
(d) under circumstances not amounting to sexual exploitation of a child under Section 
76-Sb-201, causes a child under the age of 14 years to expose his or her genitals, anus, or 
breast, if female, to the actor, with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the 
actor or the child; or 
(e) performs any other act of lewdness. 
(a) Lewdness involving a child is a class A misdemeanor, except under Subsection 
(2)(b). 
(b) Lewdness involving a child is a third degree felony if at the time of the violation: 
(i) the person is a sex offender as defined in Section 77-27-21.7: or 
(ii) the person has previously been convicted of a violation of this section. 
Amended by Chapter 278, 2013 General Session 
76-3-203.9. Violent offense committed in presence of a child -- Aggravating factor. 
( 1) As used in this section: 
(a) "In the presence of a child" means: 
(i) in the physical presence of a child younger than 14 years of age; or 
(ii) having knowledge that a child younger than 14 years of age is present and 
may see or hear a violent criminal offense. 
(b) "Violent criminal offense" means any criminal offense involving violence or 
physical harm or threat of violence or physical harm, or any attempt to commit a criminal offense 
involving violence or physical harm. 
(2) The sentencing judge or the Board of Pardons and Parole shall consider as an aggravating 
factor in their deliberations that the defendant committed the violent criminal offense in the 
presence of a child. 
(3) The sentencing judge or the Board of Pardons and Parole shall also consider whether the 
penalty for the offense is already increased by other existing provisions oflaw. 
(4) This section does not affect or limit any individual's constitutional right to the lawful 
expression of free speech or other recognized rights secured by the Constitution or laws of Utah 
or by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 
(5) This section does not affect or restrict the exercise of judicial discretion under any other 
provision of Utah law. 
Enacted by Chapter 347, 2007 General Session 
76-3-203.10. Violent offense committed in presence of a child -- Penalties. 
,;; ( 1) As used in this section: 
(a) "In the presence of a child" means: 
(i) in the physical presence of a child younger than 14 years of age; and 
(ii) having knowledge that the child is present and may see or hear the 
commission of a violent criminal offense. 
(b) "Violent criminal offense" means any criminal offense involving violence or 
physical harm or threat of violence or physical harm, or any attempt to commit a criminal offense 
involving violence or physical harm that is not a domestic violence offense as defined in Section 
'(J) 77-36-1. 
v}) 
(2) A person commits a violent criminal offense in the presence of a child if the person: 
(a) commits or attempts to commit criminal homicide, as defined in Section 76-5-201, 
against a third party in the presence of a child; 
(b) intentionally causes or attempts to cause serious bodily injury to a third party or 
uses a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 76-1-601, or other means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury, against a third party in the presence of a child; or 
(c) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (2)(a) or (b), 
commits a violent criminal offense in the presence of a child. 
(3) A person who violates Subsection (2) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Enacted by Chapter 359, 2010 General Session 
76-5-109.1. Commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Cohabitant" has the same meaning as defined in Section 78B-7-102. 
(b) "Domestic violence" has the same meaning as in Section 77-36-1. 
(c) "In the presence of a child" means: 
(i) in the physical presence of a child; or 
(ii) 
domestic violence. 
having knowledge that a child is present and may see or hear an act of 
(2) A person commits domestic violence in the presence of a child if the person: 
(a) commits or attempts to commit criminal homicide, as defined in Section 76-5-201, 
against a cohabitant in the presence of a child; or 
(b) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to a cohabitant or uses a dangerous 
weapon, as defined in Section 76-1-601, or other means or force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury against a cohabitant, in the presence of a child; or 
(c) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (2)( a) or (b ), 
commits an act of domestic violence in the presence of a child. 
(3) (a) 
(b) 
A person who violates Subsection (2)(a) or (b) is guilty of a third degree felony. 
A person who violates Subsection (2)( c) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(4) A charge under this section is separate and distinct from, and is in addition to, a charge of 
domestic violence where the victim is the cohabitant. Either or both charges may be filed by the 
prosecutor. 
(5) A person who commits a violation of this section when more than one child is present is 
guilty of one offense of domestic violence in the presence of a child regarding each child present 
when the violation occurred. 
Amended by Chapter 70, 2009 General Session 
